The Menaced Assassin. 1926.

The Menaced Assassin. 1926.
Rene Magritte

Monday, March 22, 2010

Group Therapy and Equus

To this point in the class, we have quickly surveyed many schools of literary theory. I have no doubt that we could spend one semester talking about each style of thinking. But this class is a quick look at theory, so that's what you get.
For me, in me, this run and gun is good and bad. Good because I am now aware that Formalism and Post Structuralism exist as schools of theory. If I choose I can further study the nuances of Derrida and Foucault. The bad is this type of class creates, at least in myself, a schizophrenic mind set when using theory on literature. I know just enough to be dangerous. There are many competing theories running around in my brain. Sometimes I mix this one with that one. I have a friend who took her Ph.D. only on one aspect of Freud. She wrote a 450 page document about dependence and codependence. Who am I to use Freud in analyzing literature?
Take that mindset and apply it to a group effort of seven schizophrenic literary theory dilettantes and you have a party or a fight. Maybe a little of both. No matter. The value of quick immersion and potential long term study of theory out weighs the immediate frustration.

Equus by Peter Shaffer: The Differance between Pagan and Christian Sacrifice?

Equus is a play about a boy, Alan Strang, who blinds six horses with a hoof pick. Equus is a play about a psychiatrist, Martin Dysart, who must normalize the boy back into society. But Dysart discovers that his own pagan outlook is deficient next to Alan’s ecstatic experience as self created God-incarnate. Despite the horror of Alan’s cruelty, Dysart sees that Alan’s religious megalomania might be the correct path to a fruitful life. However, Dysart’s job is to push Alan back on the accepted path that society mandates. During the process, Dysart decides to retire from the path and reclaim something of his individual self lost in service to culture. Such is the dichotomy between the individual and society in Equus.
But this story of a boy, Alan, versus a society also runs congruent with the drama of the clash of paganism and Christianity. Much of the critical work on Equus discusses Nietzsche’s Dionysian and Apollonian undercurrent. In The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche criticizes Euripides for preferring rational thinking over base human behavior when Euripides chooses “to separate this primitive and all-powerful Dionysian element from tragedy, and to build up a new and purified form of tragedy on the basis of a non-Dionysian art, morality, and conception of things” (Nietzsche 47). Most critical literary thinkers prefer this Greek myth dichotomy regarding Equus. Anna Despotopoulou’s article From Dionysus to Gorgon: Peter Shaffer’s Revision of Classical Myth and Theory is a typical response to the play and builds on Nietzsche’s work. But these theories ignore the obvious Christian references and the Christian and pagan battle.
Yet, The Greek myth framework is a useful point of departure in discussing Equus. The stage is literally set as a pagan altar. At the first point in the play, the stage is a polytheistic altar owned and operated by the psychiatrist-priest Dysart. There are no crosses. There are no Jesus figures. The stage is bare and receptive to ritual ceremony and blood sacrifice. Early in the play, Dysart in his dream is a “chief priest in Homeric Greece . . . wearing a wide gold mask, all noble and bearded” (Shaffer 17). At least in his mind, Dysart’s psychiatric office (the stage) is a place where “the sacrifice is a herd of children: about 500 boys and girls” (Shaffer 17). And into this stark domain, Dysart, in the opening lines of the play, manifests for our pleasure, Alan and the horse Nugget under a bright light. The bright light, like Bentham’s and Foucault’s scrutiny, press upon Alan to reveal the truth of himself. The stage is set.
The first line of “The Setting” describes the stage as containing “a square of wood set on a circle of wood” (Shaffer 3). This description is reminiscent of the idiom of forcing a square peg to fit into a round hole. Of course, if you chisel away at the square peg until the diagonal is less than the diameter, then the square peg will fit into the round hole. That might require losing a large amount of the character of the square peg. If Alan is the zealous square peg then the round hole is Dysart’s, and society’s, normalized conventions. Dysart must shape Alan to fit.
But Alan cannot easily be reduced. Instead, over the course of the play, Alan’s world overpowers Dysart’s altar. Little by little, as Dysart probes Alan’s psyche, Alan’s pseudo-Christian world consumes Dysart’s pagan arena.
Leonard Mustazza directly confronts the Greek myth structure of most critical thinkers: “The fact is that only a small part of Alan’s worship can be characterized as “Dionysian” (orgiastic and ecstatic). Instead, the vast majority of Alan’s “myth” is based upon Judeo-Christian theology and rite” (Mustazza 175). Nietzsche’s argument is valid as far as it goes. In tragedy, if Dionysus and Apollo are not equal enemies, the story is weak and uninteresting. However, Equus is a powerful play because the clash of the Christian and the pagan is in addition to the fight between base desire and intellect. Once each character’s mask is dropped or torn away, then these conflicts are revealed to the audience.
Masks help individuals hide their basic instincts from society. If the individual can’t find an appropriate mask, then culture will fashion a mask for them. In Equus, the only person not wearing a mask is Alan. Alan’s parents, Frank and Dora, hide behind the masks of Christianity and atheism or the roles of husband and wife. Dysart’s masks are psychiatry and a boring marriage. Dysart’s job is to fashion Alan’s mask and to reintroduce the masked boy into the masque of society. Even the horse actors wear masks, but theirs is of a different nature. In the description of “The Horses” at the beginning of the play, Shaffer writes about the horse masks, “The actors’ own heads are seen beneath them: no attempt should be made to conceal them” (Shaffer 5). It is alright, within the play, for the horse/human to exist. Alan desires to become one with the horse god. His rituals and ceremonies help him to reveal his human nature and celebrate his horse nature.
No matter the religious nature, whether Christian or pagan, ceremonies and rituals provide a liminal state between the mundane and the spiritual. Alan used ritual and self flogging to transcend the everyday. Dysart used the ritual of psychiatry to help patients explore their feelings, but the ritual never allowed Dysart to transcend his everyday life.
In Dysart’s psychiatric world, one useful liminal state is dreams. If we are condemned for our actions in our dreams, then all of us are guilty of transgressions. Dreams redirect the pressures of life so that each of us will not act out our often violent, sexually deviant and anarchic fantasies. Dysart doesn’t act on his dream of sacrificing boys and girls. He sees the dream as an indicator of his subconscious feelings about his job as a psychiatrist.
But Alan isn’t dreaming. He is experiencing. His thoughts manifest in real time action. Once Dysart understands this, he questions his own dreams and his own reality. “Dysart . . .once in touch with the boy’s authentic spirituality, comes face to face with his own artificial existence and envies the creativity that the boy’s worship stimulates” (Despotopoulou 86).
Finally, Dysart can fully appreciate the mystical experience of Alan. At the beginning of the play, when Dysart is looking back in retrospect during his first monologue, he uses words like “sweaty,” “nudging,” “kissing,” “embraces,” to describe the manner of Alan and the horse Nugget. In awe and respect, Dysart won’t name the boy, but calls him “he.” Dysart says of himself that he (himself) is “all reined up in old language and old assumptions . . . because my educated, average head is being held at the wrong angle” (Shaffer 10).
The languageused by Dysart and by Alan describe an ecstatic experience. In scenes 20 and 21 of Act one (Shaffer 65-72), Alan describes how he sheds his clothes to ride the horses. He places a stick in his mouth that he calls the “Manbit” and hides the stick in the “Ark of the Manbit.” He gives the horse a lump of sugar as “His Last Supper.” Alan calls the horse “Equus the Godslave.” Finally, in an ecstatic trance, Alan chants over and over, “Ha, ha, ha, ha.” This language is reminiscent of St. Teresa of Avila’s description of her own religious experience. “These sublime favours leave the soul so desirous of fully enjoying Him Who has bestowed them, that life becomes a painful, though delicious torture, and death is ardently longed for” (St. Teresa 128). “Equus embodies Alan’s religious and sexual desire as well as his religious and sexual frustration. He blinds the horses in an enraged and pathetic attempt to avert the accusing eye of Equus, his true lover and God” (Quigley 22). Alan’s ecstasy I s“agape love” or that sentiment of joy in the ecstasy of communion and union with the divine that manifest as a physical sexual experience but carries none of the base connotations of human intercourse. The Virgin Mary’s experience with the Holy Spirit and the resulting birth of Jesus represent the apex of the agape experience.
How is the audience meant to react to the play? Certainly the blinding of the horses is atrocious, but the total consumption by God of the devotee is an experience wished for by many religious zealots of different religions. They are indeed called zealots because their actions seem abnormal and incomprehensible. Dysart recognizes this fact and at the same time comprehends the banality of his own life. Sigmund Freud’s friend and confidant, C. G. Jung, wrote, “I . . . shall content myself with the fact that a natural function which has existed from the beginning, like the religious function, cannot be disposed of with rationalistic and so-called enlightened criticism” (Jung 38).

Friday, March 5, 2010

Deconstructing Mr. Whiskers

One way for me to look at deconstruction is to use the mathematical concepts of calculus and set theory. Calculus developed as a technique to find ever smaller and smaller increments, to try and understand the infinitesimal difference between one point in time and the next point in time. Set theory looks at the relationships between groups.

Let’s say I am thinking about my pet cat, Mr. Whiskers. The trick is to explain Mr. Whiskers to you, either in writing or in speech. Using set theory, I can quickly bypass the scientific taxonomy that starts at the top with “life” and “domain” and “kingdom.” You assume my cat is alive and a member of the animal kingdom. Without talking about specifics, we’ve moved from the large group of all living things, to a subgroup of animals and then to the set of cats. That is the language history that you and I share, so we don’t have to get involved in those introductory descriptions.

But if you truly want to know Mr. Whiskers, then I must relate to you smaller and smaller differences (sets) between my cat and other cats. If Mr. Whiskers is purebred, I could tell you he is Himalayan. An image would come to your mind. But he is neither purebred nor Himalayan. Then I might say he is a “he” and he is black with white paws. That might be enough for you. Or you might want to know whether he is a kitten or a cat. You might want to know whether he is an indoor cat, outdoor cat or both. Does Mr. Whiskers eat wet food or dry? Has he been neutered?

Even with this continued parsing, you will never know Mr. Whiskers the way I know him. Of course, some of this could be avoided if I simply carried a picture of Mr. Whiskers in my wallet. But just as importantly, when you meet Mr. Whiskers, you and I will know him in a different way. Mr. Whiskers and I enjoy the baggage of history. I know about the spilled milk and the cat claws digging into the sofa legs. There is the woman that sold me Mr. Whiskers.

The physical form I call “Mr. Whiskers” can only be estimated by the language concept of “Mr. Whiskers.” Deconstruction tells me that no matter how many differences I discover using language, no matter how many sets and subsets of smaller distinctions and discriminations I create, I can only approximate Mr. Whiskers.

In Introductory Deconstruction, Rivkin and Ryan state, “One important implication of this insight is that if all things are produced as identities by their differences from other things, then a complete determination of identity would require an endless inventory of relations to other terms in a potentially infinite network of differences. Truth, as a result, will always be incomplete” (258). Practically, we have to stop somewhere when imparting information. We each know there is a point where finer distinctions are not necessary in the course of human communication. Each speech or written event benefits by stopping or continuing depending on the purpose and desired outcome.

For me, poetry is the most elegant form of deconstruction, although poetry existed long before the concept of deconstruction as a theory existed. If I start a poem this way:

More than two but less than three
transportation thoroughfares separated
in a sparse forest of primary color

you would think me clumsy, but your subconscious might recognize my clumsiness as the popular pattern by Robert Frost:

Two roads diverged in a yellow wood,

Frost doesn’t tell us whether the road is dirt or paved or rock or cobblestone. Frost doesn’t tell us if the forest is sparse or dense. He deconstructed an image to this precise stopping point so we could reconstruct and own it ourselves, each individually in our own clumsy way.